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A Probabilistic `Re-View' on Felsenthal and Machover's
The Measurement of Voting Power
Olga Birkmeier and Friedrich Pukelsheim
Felsenthal/Machover's 1998 celebrated monograph on The Measurement of Voting Power
set o a renewed impetus on the analysis of weighted voting systems. Their presentation
strikes a balance between the game-theoretic and the probabilistic approaches to the sub-
ject. The present paper holds that the probabilistic view may be protably extended even
further, in providing helpful language as well as motivating new results.
1. The book. Dan Felsenthal and Moshe Machover's (1998) monograph on The
Measurement of Voting Power served a double purpose, of concisely presenting the
state of the art of the theory of weighted voting systems, and of initiating novel strains
of research in the area. The authors achieved these goals by carefully developing the
mathematical background, game theory and probability theory. The mathematical
frame was developed not in an ivory tower seclusion, but along pertinent applications
such as US-American court cases, or the Council of Ministers of the European Union.
The interplay of ideal theory and concrete applications proved most fertile.
In Augsburg we repeatedly worked through the book in the course of seminars
for our students who have a strong background in probability theory and statistics.
Therefore we paid particular attention to the book's probabilistic language, and ex-
perimented with the technical vocabulary, in order to optimize communication with
non-mathematical contemporaries. An instant stumbling stone was felt to be the pho-
netic closeness of two central notions of the subject, voting weight and voting power. In
German they translate into Stimmgewicht and Stimmkraft. Since the German language
puts a strong emphasis on the rst syllable of a compound word, a negligent speaker
may oer the audience an audible Stimm: : :, followed by a murmured : : :something,
thus completely missing the point. For this reason we tried to separate the notions
more clearly. We kept voting weight, but replaced absolute voting power by inuence
probability, and relative voting power by power share. The term share indicates that
the ensemble of these indices totals unity, whence they form a power distribution.
In the present paper we explicate the probabilistic approach, in as far as we found
it telling and conducive. The approach is by no means new. It dates back at least to
Stran (1978, 1988), and the Felsenthal/Machover (1998) monograph makes excellent
use of it. Nevertheless we believe that a `re-view' on its role may prove useful.
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In their nal Chapter 8, Felsenthal/Machover (1998) make a point to take ab-
stentions seriously. We maintain that ternary voting proles provide a suciently
general reference set supporting both, ternary decision rules that permit abstentions,
and binary decision rules that are restricted to Yea-Nay voting (Section 2). The en-
suing development depends on the probability distribution adopted. A model is truly
ternary when it assigns positive weights to voting proles with at least one absten-
tion. The case of abstention probability zero leads back to the binary setting. The
Penrose/Banzhaf models (Section 3) and the Shapley/Shubik models (Section 4) come
with abstention probabilities t 2 [0; 1) that aord a smooth transition between ternary
and binary analyzes. We conclude with an outlook on bloc decision rules, a prime ex-
ample being provided by the Council of Ministers of the European Union (Section 5).
2. Ternary voting proles. Let N denote an assembly consisting of nitely many
agents j. When a proposal is tabled and a vote is taken, the results are recorded as
a vector a = (aj)j2N , a voting prole. The vote of agent j is reported as aj = yes
when j votes Yea, aj = no when j votes Nay, or aj = abstain when j abstains. The
natural ordering among these values is no  abstain  yes. Felsenthal/Machover
(1998, p. 282) use the coding no =  1, abstain = 0, and yes = 1.
The ensemble of all voting proles constitutes the ternary prole space

N =
n
(aj)j2N
 aj 2 fno; abstain; yesg; for all j 2 No:
Every prole a 2 
N induces a region of growing acceptance consisting of those pro-
les b that express at least as much acceptance as is reported in a,
[a; yes] =
n
(bj)j2N 2 
N
 aj  bj  yes; for all j 2 No:
A subset WN  
N is called a decision rule when it satises the three properties
(1) [a; yes] WN ; for all a 2WN ;
(2) (yes; : : : ; yes) 2WN ;
(3) (abstain; : : : ; abstain) 62WN :
The proles a that constitute the subset WN are called winning, in the sense that a
proposal is carried if and only if a belongs to WN . Here we do not consider systems in
which the nal outcome might be a tie. The complement WCN = 
N nWN therefore
comprises the proles that are loosing. Thus a subset WN is a decision rule if and
only if (1) it is acceptance monotone: if a is winning and b reports at least as much
acceptance as does a, then b is also winning, (2) unanimous acceptance is winning, and
(3) unanimous abstention is loosing.
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Now we x some decision rule WN , and investigate its merits from the point of
view of agent j. Two events transpire to be of particular interest. First, there is the
set Aj(WN ) of agreeable proles, when j agrees with the nal outcome. Second, there
is the set Cj(WN ) of critical proles, when the vote of j is decisive to turn the prole
winning or loosing. Let the notation (ai)i 6=j &(yes)j represent the prole where the
votes of the other agents i 6= j are concatenated with a Yea from agent j. Similarly
(ai)i 6=j &(no)j is to indicate that the votes of the others is completed with j's Nay.
The two events mentioned may then be described as follows:
Aj(WN ) =
n
a 2WN
 aj = yeso [ na 2WCN  aj = noo;
Cj(WN ) =
n
a 2 
N
 (ai)i 6=j &(yes)j 2WN and (ai)i 6=j &(no)j 2WCNo:
So far the exposition is descriptive and qualitative. It is only now that we consider
quantitative indices. All of them originate from a probability measure P given on the
ternary prole space 
N , with some of them being peculiar to an agent j:
P [WN ] the eciency of the decision rule WN ;
P

Aj(WN )

the success probability of agent j;
P

Cj(WN )

the inuence probability of agent j;
P

Cj(WN )

=P (WN ) the power share of agent j; utilizing
P (WN ) =
P
i2N P

Ci(WN )

the inuence sensitivity of the decision rule WN :
The indices coincide with those in the monograph Felsenthal and Machover (1998),
except that there they are related to the Penrose/Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik dis-
tributions. Specically, the Penrose/Banzhaf inuence probability of agent j is the
same as the Banzhaf power (or absolute Banzhaf index) of j, and the power share of j
coincides with the Banzhaf index of voting power (or relative Banzhaf index) of j. Our
motivation for not specializing too early is that there are results like Theorem 1 which
hold quite generally. To this end we need to introduce some notation.
The dual prole dual(a) of a ternary voting prole a 2 
N is dened by reversing
the votes of all agents j 2 N ,
 
dual(a)

j
=
8<:
no in case aj = yes,
abstain in case aj = abstain,
yes in case aj = no.
A distribution P is said to be selfdual when a voting prole and its dual are assigned
identical probabilities, P [fag] = P fdual(a)g.
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A distribution P is said to be exchangeable when it remains invariant under all
permutations of the assembly N . In the presence of exchangeability, a maximal in-
variant statistic tallies Yeas, Nays, and abstentions of a voting prole a 2 
N into the
three counts Yea(a), Nay(a), and Abs(a), respectively.
The success margin (WN )(a) is dened to be the dierence between the number
of those who vote in favor of the nal outcome, and those who vote against it,
(WN )(a) =
(
Yea(a) Nay(a) in case a 2WN ,
Nay(a) Yea(a) in case a 2WCN .
Two decision rules deserve special attention. The rst is the unanimity rule UN ,
signaling acceptance when nobody is objecting, and the second is the straight majority
rule MN , requiring the Yeas to outnumber the Nays,
UN =
n
(aj)j2N 2 
N
 Yea(a) > 0 = Nay(a)o;
MN =
n
(aj)j2N 2 
N
 Yea(a) > Nay(a)o:
Theorem 1. Let the ternary prole space 
N be equipped with be a selfdual and
exchangeable probability distribution P , and let WN be an arbitrary decision rule.
Then the expected success margin of WN lies between the expected success margins
of the unanimity rule and of the straight majority rule,
EP

(UN )
  EP (WN )  EP (MN ):
Proof. See Proposition 4.1 in Birkmeier/Kau/Pukelsheim (2011).
The unanimity rule and the straight majority rule are two instances of the wider
class of weighted decision rules WN [q; (wj)j2N ], determined by the quota q 2 [0; 1)
and the voting weights wj > 0 of the agents j 2 N . Let YCW(a) =
P
j2N :aj=yes wj
denote the Yea-voters' cumulative weight, and NCW(a) =
P
j2N :aj=no wj the Nay-
voters' cumulative weight. A ternary voting prole a is dened to be winning, a 2
WN [q; (wj)j2N ], when the Yea-voters' cumulative weight exceeds the fraction q of the
cumulative weight of all non-abstainers, YCW(a) > q   YCW(a) + NCW(a).
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3. The Penrose/Banzhaf model. The Penrose/Banzhaf distribution P tN assumes
that all agents act independently, abstain with a common abstention probability t 2
[0; 1), and divide the remaining likelihood 1  t equally between a Yea and a Nay. In
this model, a ternary voting prole a 2 
N carries the probability
P tN [fag] =
1
2Yea(a)+Nay(a)
(1  t)Yea(a)+Nay(a) tAbs(a):
When the ternary parameter t vanishes, voting proles that contain an abstention
are assigned zero probability. Thus a prole carries positive mass only when every agent
votes Yea or Nay. That is, with t = 0 the ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model reduces to
the familiar binary Penrose/Banzhaf model. The ternary Penrose/Banzhaf model thus
embraces the binary Penrose/Banzhaf model as a degenerate case. A sample result is
provided by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let the ternary prole space 
N be equipped with the Penrose/Banz-
haf distribution P tN , with abstention probability t 2 [0; 1), and let WN be an arbitrary
decision rule.
(i) For all agents j 2 N , success and inuence probabilities are related through
P tN

Aj(WN )

=
1  t
2
+
1  t
2
P tN

Cj(WN )

:
(ii) The inuence sensitivity and the expected success margin of WN fulll
P t
N
(WN ) =
1
1  tEP tN

(WN )

:
Proof. See Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 in Birkmeier/Kau/Pukelsheim (2011).
With t = 0, this coincides with the results in Theorems 3.2.16 and 3.3.5 in Felsen-
thal/Machover (1998), see also Ru/Pukelsheim (2010). Birkmeier (2011, Satz 2.3.4)
presents a version of part (i) dealing with a slightly larger set of proles that are con-
sidered a success for agent j, namely those that are agreeable to agent j combined with
those wherein j abstains (and which might be considered `weakly agreeable').
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4. The Shapley/Shubik model. The Shapley/Shubik distribution StN on 
N is
built up in three stages. The rst stage, dealing with abstentions, is new. We propose
to assume all agents to abstain independently, with a common abstention probability
t 2 [0; 1). Under this assumption the number ` of those who abstain follows a binomial
distribution, n!`!(n `)! t
`(1  t)n `. The second and third stages are standard. The num-
ber of Yea-voters k is taken to attain each of its possible values 0; : : : ; n   ` with the
same probability, 1=
 
n  `+ 1. Third, each of the n!k!`!(n k `)! proles with k Yeas, `
abstentions, and n   k   ` Nays is considered equally likely. Thus, with some of the
factorial terms canceling out and after re-substituting Yea(a) for k and Yea(a)+Nay(a)
for n  `, the total probability of a ternary voting prole a 2 
N becomes
StN [fag] =
Yea(a)! Nay(a)! 
Yea(a) + Nay(a) + 1

!
(1  t)Yea(a)+Nay(a) tAbs(a):
In binary models, it is well-known that every decision ruleWN has Shapley/Shubik
inuence sensitivity equal to unity. This entails two intriguing consequences, that the
Shapley/Shubik sensitivity is insensitive to the specic decision rule WN , and that
the Shapley/Shubik inuence probability of an agent j coincides with her or his power
share. In ternary Shapley/Shubik models, the rst conclusion persists, the second does
not.
Theorem 3. Let the ternary prole space 
N be equipped with the Shapley/Shubik
distribution StN , with abstention probability t 2 [0; 1), and let n be the cardinality of
the assembly N .
Then all decision rules WN share an identical inuence sensitivity,
St
N
(WN ) =
1  tn
1  t :
Proof. See Satz 2.3.9 in Birkmeier (2011).
The right hand side is the same as 1+ t+   + tn 1. Hence its limit equals n, the
number of agents, as the abstention probability t tends to unity. This is quite plausible
since, with the likelihood of abstention growing, each of the n agents is getting to be
more and more critical when casting a clear Yea- or Nay-vote, and in the end acquires
an inuence probability equal to unity.
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5. The EU Council of Ministers. In some applications the grand assembly N is
partitioned into disjoint subsets, called blocs. The associated compound decision rule
on N is composed of internal decision rules within blocs, and a second-level decision
rule among bloc delegates. An example is the Council of Ministers of the European
Union, where the entirety of the Union citizens, N , is partitioned into the 27 blocs of
its Member States' citizenries that are represented by their Ministers.
In the binary Penrose/Banzhaf bloc model, a compound inuence probability of
citizen j 2 N typically factorizes into the product of the internal inuence probabil-
ity of j in her or his bloc B, times the second-level inuence probability of bloc B
relative to the partitioning specied, see Stran (1978), Felsenthal/Machover (2002),
Laruelle/Valenciano (2004), or Ru/Pukelsheim (2010). These product formulas gen-
eralize to carry over to ternary Penrose/Banzhaf bloc models, see Birkmeier (2011)
for a bottom up construction (Satz 5.1.3) as well as for a top down construction (Satz
5.1.6).
The analysis may be employed to design bloc decision rules that permit absten-
tions. The underlying notion of optimality is based on a weighted average, of the
diplomatic one state, one vote principle that underlies international relations among
Member States, and of the democratic one person, one vote principle that would apply
to the Union citizens, see Laruelle/Widgren (1998) and Satz 5.3.3 in Birkmeier (2011).
However, it is by no means evident whether the Treaty of Lisbon (2010) would sup-
port the two equality principles and, if so, whether they may be mixed into a single
optimality criterion.
Nevertheless, a statistical evaluation of previous decision rules used in the EU
Council of Ministers leads to the estimates reported in Section 6.1 of Birkmeier (2011).
They suggest that, in the past, the Union functioned with a mixture of about a ten
percent weighting on the diplomatic equality principle, and a complementary ninety
percent weighting on the democratic equality principle. With these weightings, the
optimal quota is found to be 60.98 percent, see Birkmeier (2011, page 117). This is
slightly below the quota of 61.6 percent proposed in the Jagiellonian Compromise of
S lomczynski/ _Zyczkowski (2010).
The mixture criterion is roughly in line with the composition of the European
Parliament where each Member State is guaranteed six seats out of a total of 751 seats.
That is, twenty percent of the seats are preassigned to the Member States obeying the
diplomatic equality principle of one state, one vote. The remaining eighty percent
then might be allocated via a proportional representation apportionment method to
honor the democratic equality principle of one person, one vote, as proposed in the
Cambridge Compromise of Grimmett et al. (2011).
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